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The Function of the Superhero at 
the Present Time
Sean Carney
History is no longer an enigmatic flux to which men and things 
are subjected. It is no longer a thing to be explained by the inter­
vention of transcendental powers or made meaningful by refer­
ence to transcendental values. History is, on the one hand, the 
product (albeit the unconscious one) of man’s own activity, on 
the other hand it is the succession of those processes in which 
the forms taken by this activity and the relations of man to him­
self (to nature, to other men) are overthrown. [...] And the nature 
of history is precisely that every definition degenerates into an 
illusion: history is the history of the unceasing overthrow of the 
objective forms that shape the life of man. [...] From this stand­
point alone does history really become a history of mankind. For 
it contains nothing that does not lead back ultimately to men and 
to the relations between men. (Lukacs 185-86)
If we accept the popular assumption that all superhero comics today live in the 
shadow of two towering monoliths that changed the face of the superhero, namely 
Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons’ Watchmen (1986) and Frank Miller’s The Dark 
Knight Returns (1986), then we may suggest a general organizing framework in 
which to situate an investigation into the current condition of the superhero. For 
the question which Watchmen and The Dark Knight Returns seem to have forced 
out into the open is: what is the social function of the superhero? This question is 
in fact double-voiced: it describes both the function of the superhero qua character
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in a fictional world, and also the social function of the superhero, its social symbol­
ism, within the reader’s world. The answer inaugurated by both those books is a 
suitably double-voiced reply: the representation of fictional worlds in which super­
heroes are no longer welcome, and thus where their social function cannot be taken 
for granted. This becomes a reflection upon the ideological function of superhero 
comics. Both books offer situations where superheroes are forced to justify them­
selves to their societies, and this justification (or lack thereof) is simultaneously an 
argument for (or against) the social function of superheroes as ideological con­
structions in the reader’s world. However much the problem of the social function 
of the superhero may have been a latent question in earlier moments (we could 
argue, for example, that the Silver Age, with its wry self-reflexivity and its revisionist 
re-situating of the superhero within more realistic contexts and problems, is also 
asking the question of the social function of the superhero), it was with Watchmen 
and The Dark Knight Returns that the question was forced, given overt expression 
in an artistic formulation suitably impressive as to make a lasting impact. The result 
is an irresolvable anxiety of influence for contemporary superhero comics.
By placing superheroes in more “realistic” settings, Frank Miller and Alan Moore 
have essentially inserted the superhero within social and political contexts. In this 
paper, I will examine how the anxiety provoked by Watchmen and The Dark Knight 
Returns forces subsequent superhero narratives to contend with themes that are 
inherently historical and political. In my approach, I differ from one of the most 
recent critical assessments of superhero comics, which reads them as refusals of 
Moore and Miller’s “realistic” politicization of the superhero. The anxiety of influ­
ence in contemporary superhero comics has been thoroughly investigated in Geoff 
Klock’s insightful and groundbreaking How to Read Superhero Comics and Why 
(2002), but the rigorous formalism of Klock’s analysis, and the constant prioritizing 
of his thesis that superhero comics today are only about other superhero comics, 
without reference to social or political contexts, leads Klock into a series of 
depoliticizing gestures in his readings, which originate in his refusal of myth criti­
cism as a valid means of enquiry. His reading of the conclusion of The Dark Knight 
Returns, for example, is anxious about its own refusal of the political implications of 
Miller’s narrative (Klock 49). The strength of Klock’s scholarship is precisely its 
sense of historical continuity, including its awareness of the historical periods of 
superhero comics and the historical revisionism implicit in superhero narratives. 
However Klock’s history of superheroes is just that, a history of superheroes, while 
my analysis here argues that the history of superheroes must always be interpreted 
for its social symbolism, for superheroes as history.
My thesis here is that after 1986, the political function of the superhero has been 
subject to a transformation: from its origins as ideological myth, as popular symp­
tom of closed, ideological consciousness, the superhero has been reinscribed with 
a hopeful ambivalence which transforms it into a symptom of history. This is to say 
that the superhero now is a symptom of humanity becoming historical, in a philo­
sophical sense. Human beings are historical creatures because they have the abil­
ity to overreach themselves and be productive creators. This human overreaching 
is history itself. Yet the challenge of becoming historical, as described by Georg
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Lukacs in the epigraph to this essay, is how to transform human consciousness 
into this productive overreaching, as a dialectical process. Humanity has yet to 
bridge the divide in consciousness between its achieved social forms and its ability 
to overreach and transform those achievements. Humans experience this historical 
process of overreaching themselves not as gain, but rather as alienation and loss. 
Humanity is alienated from its own human potential, from its ability to transform 
itself and the world. Humans experience history as a metaphysical process to which 
they are subjected, when in fact they are this process. As I shall argue, superheroes 
are an allegorization, a rendering conscious, of this process of humanity overreach­
ing itself. The problem with traditional superheroes is that their narratives imply 
readers who will imaginatively abdicate responsibility for human actions to these 
heroes, in the same way that humans abdicate responsibility for their actions to 
something they call “history.” When human actions become achieved forms that 
humans call history and that they elevate to a transhuman, metaphysical position, 
their own actions become alienated. Contemporary revisionist superhero narra­
tives seek to return responsibility to humanity for its own deeds while also main­
taining the importance of superheroes: they are necessary because they are figures 
for humanity’s ability to overreach itself, but superheroes cannot be allowed to take 
over human responsibility from humans. Superheroes are thus allegorical figures 
for humanity’s relationship to its own history; they are allegories for the human 
ability to create forms that are larger than humanity itself, and that humans then 
need to struggle with and repossess as their own agency.
Such a reading, however, first requires a return to the two towering monoliths so 
that the critic may sweep away some of the detritus that surrounds their interpreta­
tion.' The popular reading of those books contains the assumption that their con­
cerns were to make superheroes “more realistic.” Thus these comics were attempts 
to rationalize and reify superheroes: the result was an alienation and an objectifica­
tion of the form. Read as “realism,” The Dark Knight Returns suggests that if 
Batman were real, he would be an outlaw and a vigilante, driven underground by a 
society unable to appreciate the importance of those heroes who work outside of 
conventional society, and who use violence and fear as a means of policing human­
ity. Understood literally, it is all too easy to read Miller’s revisionism as a reaction­
ary condemnation of American society’s moral decay and of its inability to appreci­
ate its exemplary figures due to the modern loss of values. The comic is then a 
condemnation of the modern, reified society. Miller’s satire of modern attitudes 
includes broad caricatures of both the base selfishness of the modern conservative 
and the bleeding-heart tolerance of the American left-liberal. However, the heavy- 
handedness of these portrayals in the book, combined with Miller’s simple, iconic 
style of illustration, caution the critic against literal interpretations. The level of 
satire here works to draw the reader’s attention to what these “talking head” char­
acters do in the book: they interpret Batman, arguing over his status as social 
symptom, or as some kind of social infection, about whether or not he provokes 
crime as much as he controls it (Miller, The Dark Knight Returns #3/9). The point is 
not to answer such questions (which a literal reading of the book as a story about 
vigilantism would attempt to do), but rather to grasp the significance of the ques­
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tioning. The Dark Knight Returns is not a book attempting primarily to explain what 
superheroes are for, or what their social significance is. Instead such thinking is the 
problem in the book. The Dark Knight Returns resists answers to the meaning of 
the Batman (what his function is) and in so doing focusses upon the activity of 
meaning-making itself. Batman’s nemesis in the story is Superman, and the conflict 
between them falls on the social function Superman has adopted. In an America 
where superheroes have been outlawed, Superman has continued to function by 
being indoctrinated as a secret weapon for the American military. This merely high­
lights how Superman has traditionally been associated with a conservative Ameri­
can ideology. Superman has always functioned as a flag, as a myth. Or rather, he 
almost immediately became this functionary. In his origins, however, Miller points 
out that Superman was something else: “Go back to the origins of Superman, before 
World War II. He was dragging generals to the front of battles. He was fighting 
corrupt landlords. He was not the symbol of the status quo he’s since become” 
(Miller, “Batman and the Twilight of the Idols” 39). For Miller, superheroes emerged 
from an anti-establishment impulse born in the spirit of the New Deal, rather than 
beginning as icons for conservative “status quo” thinking.
Within the terms of Miller’s narrative, this is exactly the problem with superhe­
roes: they function as conservative myths which solve, in an imaginary manner, 
humanity’s real social problems. Such imaginary solutions are false and therefore 
resolve nothing for the human race, merely exacerbating situations. Superman does 
this in the narrative by secretly intervening in the “Corto-Maltese Crisis,” a military 
conflict between America and the U.S.S.R., involving U.S. support for a military 
dictator (#3/9). When the Soviets are defeated, they respond by launching a single 
nuclear weapon, which Superman is forced to detonate in the African desert. Its 
consequences are devastating: the destruction of the African savannah and a 
global nuclear winter. The superhero as functionary, as problem-solver or “crime- 
fighter,” is a symptom of, and contributor to, humanity’s abdication of responsibil­
ity for its own deeds, which leads to the possibility of the extinction of the human 
race. The significant shift, then, that The Dark Knight Returns performs, is the 
transformation of the superhero from an answer, into a question or a problem with­
out solution. And this is how the most sober character in The Dark Knight Returns 
describes Batman. Batman is the contradiction between life and death that finds its 
most apparent expression in the social problem of war. Police Commissioner Gordon 
attempts to explain Batman to Gordon’s successor with a story of how Franklin 
Roosevelt apparently knew Pearl Harbour was going to be attacked by the Japa­
nese but deliberately did nothing, presumably so that the U.S.A. would enter the 
war and help bring about the historical conclusion which is, to the mind, the only 
possible, the necessary historical narrative: the defeat of the axis. Yet Gordon is 
troubled: “But a lot of innocent men died. But we won the war. It bounced back and 
forth in my head until I realized I couldn’t judge it. It was too big” (#2/40). This is 
Batman: an historical contradiction expressed in war, the necessity of murder and 
death in order for life to continue. For Gordon’s replacement, Batman is a vigilante 
to be arrested, and this story does not explain Batman to her. For Gordon, Batman 
is a problem for the mind, “too big” to be understood, but he can be described
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allegorically with a narrative in which the American President allows American lives 
to be lost so that America will enter world history. For Gordon, Batman has never been 
a myth at all, but something so big that it frustrates human understanding. In other 
words, Batman is a contradiction, and moreover an historical one. Gordon is not able to 
rationalize the invasion of Pearl Harbour in such a manner. Roosevelt’s solution is not 
acceptable to him, but neither can he reject it. He can only suffer the contradiction 
unhappily. This is the only position of truth a human can take in relation to the modem 
experience of history. It is necessarily traumatic, a position which inhabits the failure of 
sense and meaning, like the detonation of a nuclear weapon in the desert, which solves 
nothing, since life itself still suffers on a global scale.
As Batman demonstrates, this is the position of trauma itself, the failure of 
meaning which is the truth of history’s contradiction. Batman’s final showdown 
with Superman takes place in Crime Alley, where Batman’s parents were murdered 
and where Batman’s trauma became the unresolvable contradiction at the heart of 
him which drives him. From their deaths he learned that “the world only makes 
sense when you force it to” (#4/40), which he contrasts sharply with the lesson 
Superman learned from his parents, a lesson in obedience to authority. Batman 
learned a lesson in trauma as necessity. Batman does not abandon sense or mean­
ing; he instead avows that whatever order humans make from the world is only 
provisional and transitory, and a product of their own efforts, because beneath it is 
the bedrock trauma of history, as Commissioner Gordon describes it. In Miller’s 
narrative, ideological closure, in the form of Superman, is demystified and in its 
place the reader is offered a perspective on history in the form of Batman. This 
necessitates that the conclusion of the narrative not be read literally, as the forming 
of an underground militia. The reader needs to attend to the ambiguity of the 
conclusion and acknowledge Miller’s revisionism: over the course of the book 
Batman gives up his back-alley vigilantism, realizing that he has been misguided in 
his actions. I suggest that this is an abandonment of his function as a social myth. 
He fakes his own death, and starts training those whom he had once arrested. But 
what they are going to do is never entirely clear. Batman now sets himself “to bring 
sense to a world plagued by worse than thieves and murderers” (#4/47), meaning, 
presumably, the American government which does not truly represent humanity’s 
best interests. However, I think the reader needs to avoid reading beyond the end 
of the narrative here: Batman has achieved his goal at the end of the story; he has 
ceased to be a myth because he has ceased to serve a concrete social function. 
What he offers then is to be found precisely in the form of the comic itself: a 
narrative of the break from myth which gives the reader a perspective on history, as 
an unfinished narrative itself.
Superhero comics post -Watchmen and The Dark Knight Returns have re­
sponded to this awakening historical consciousness in two ways: on the one hand, 
through a misinterpretation of this revisionism as a simple rendering of superhe­
roes “more realistically,” which has resulted in a large body of inferior work explor­
ing the “problems of the superhero in the real world.” Alternately, and more signifi­
cantly, the problem of history has come to be of primary importance in mainstream 
superhero comics of the 1990s. The most immediate example of this latter, produc­
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tive direction is Kurt Busiek and Alex Ross’s Marvels (1994). Marvels takes revi­
sionism a step further than The Dark Knight Returns by telling a story from the 
perspective of a middle-American every man photographer named Phil Sheldon 
whose career is founded upon taking photos of superheroes. The illustrative style 
of Marvels is deceptive: the pleasure of the comic is initially based on Ross’s 
realistic Norman Rockwell-esque paintings of the heroes of Marvel comics. The 
reader of Marvels might be forgiven for thinking this is another story about super­
heroes in “realistic” contexts due to the mimetic realism of the images. Yet I want to 
suggest that this is not a story about superheroes at all, but a deliberate allegory for 
shifts in American consciousness over four periods in twentieth-century history. 
As such, Marvels is a demonstration of how superheroes work as cultural myths, 
and, at times, as symptoms of history, which looms larger than mythic, national 
consciousness, threatening to cancel the closure of the ideological.
Book One of Marvels takes Pearl Harbour, the moment Commissioner Gordon 
describes in The Dark Knight Returns as Batman himself and as the unsolvable 
contradiction of history, and uses this same moment as the ground through which 
to analyze the emergence of the superhero. Busiek manages a deft balancing act of 
the literal and allegorical here. Book One begins in 1939 and, through the lens of Phil 
Sheldon, describes two narratives happening simultaneously. On the one hand, the 
beginning of the Second World War, and on the other, the appearance of the origi­
nal Human Torch and the Sub-Mariner, Golden Age Marvel superheroes. Marvels 
asks the reader to see that these two phenomena, war and superhero, are the same 
thing. The story is an allegory, in a proper sense, for American consciousness and 
the American self-image as it is confronted by world-historical events happening 
beyond its borders, which it can only greet with fear and incomprehension. Phil 
Sheldon is a paradigmatic everyman-American. His thoughts about the superhe­
roes are also the American thoughts about the nascent war: his experience is “a 
story of fear and awe. And a world cut loose from its moorings” (Busiek and Ross, 
Marvels# 1, n. pag.). The appearance of the Human Torch and the Sub-Mariner has 
a discomfiting effect on Phil Sheldon, making the island-world of New York seem 
smaller, because these Marvels are, as he puts it, “more than human.” Whereas he 
had previously been eager to pursue a career as news photographer in Europe, 
Sheldon is now deeply afraid, but not of the coming war, rather of the superhumans. 
The effect on other Americans is identical: “Before they came. We were so big. So 
grand. We were Americans — Young. Strong. Vital! We were the ones who got 
things done. But we’d gotten smaller. I could see it in those same faces — faces that 
had once been so confident. So brash. We weren’t the players anymore. We were 
spectators. We were waiting for something — without knowing what it was — .” 
(#1, n. pag.). Sheldon’s problem in Book One is how to overcome that belittlement 
and sense of fear caused by figures that seem larger than American consciousness. 
Sheldon is resentful of something that seems to have thieved from Americans their 
place at the centre of the world. Of course, the “Marvels” as the heroes are called, 
are here being used as a description of history, as something larger than the human, 
in this case larger than the American human. The Marvels are simply that which, in 
their inexorable necessity, subject humans to their whims and decenter their confi­
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dence. The Churchillian metaphor Sheldon happens upon is that of a storm: “It was 
like a war — not just the battles. But the very fact of the marvels themselves. A war 
— or some freakish, violent storm” (#1). Sheldon’s frustration with the Marvels is 
that a storm or a war is larger than individuals and affords them no agency, offering 
them no restitution for the damage it causes.
The solution that immediately arrives is a heroic nationalist myth, which bridges 
the divide between Americans and world history: Captain America, a Marvel, no 
different from the others except that his costume is an American flag, and that he 
takes that flag into the war while America itself stays out of it. Yet in order for the 
conflict embodied by Sheldon to be resolved, he has to face the storm itself: when 
the Sub-Mariner brings a tidal wave against New York, Sheldon has his chance. 
This wave represents for him the end result of the brewing storm. Instead of hiding 
he bears witness to the fight between the Human Torch and the Sub-Mariner, and is 
blinded in one eye during the conflict. He awakens in a hospital bed to discover that 
Japan has attacked Pearl Harbour, and that America is at war. The allegory is trans­
parent: the storm represented by the Marvels is the storm of world history, of 
necessity. Phil’s loss of an eye is the Pearl Harbour attack. Whereas Miller repre­
sented the American encounter with necessity, Pearl Harbour, as an open contra­
diction, Busiek focusses instead on the social symbolism of the superhero as a 
mediating figure, who happily resolves the problem of history. Sheldon describes 
the world as changed, and America as having no choice but to change with it, and 
at the end of Book One, this is presented as emancipatory and romantic rather than 
as a suffering for the mind. The heroes have saved America, in as much as they 
have saved it from confronting history without a mythic mediator.
Having been offered, from the beginning of the narrative, a position outside of 
American consciousness looking in, the reader can appreciate the ingenious sleight- 
of-hand that Busiek performs as he follows the allegory through to its conclusion. 
Book Two is concerned primarily with the Uncanny X-Men, who first appeared in 
comics in September 1963, but who function in Marvels as figures for those 
scapegoated by American paranoia and witchhunts during the 1950s. Phil Sheldon, 
patriotically inspired by Captain America and the new, “human” heroes like the 
Fantastic Four, pelts the mutant X-Men with bricks like everyone else. Phil Sheldon’s 
only awareness that these two facets of public response are not separate but 
reciprocal comes to him in the darkroom: “I had to wonder: were the mutants the 
price we paid for the marvels? The negatives without which the pictures we wanted 
couldn’t exist?” (#2). Here Phil has an intimation of the necessarily unconscious, 
repressed content of consciousness. The X-Men here step into the place of history, 
which the Human Torch and the Sub-Mariner had previously occupied. The bounded 
national consciousness, without a relationship with the Other, must therefore produce 
an enemy to exclude. History remains disavowed, yet pressing necessity.
This is demonstrated in Book Three of Marvels, which uses a famous story from 
The Fantastic Four issues # 48-50, concerning the coming of a world-devouring 
entity named Galactus, as an allegory for the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Book Four 
portrays the death of Gwen Stacy in The Amazing Spider-M an#\2\-22  as an alle­
gory for America’s final loss of innocence during Viet Nam. Meanwhile the Kree-
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Skrull war from The Avengers # 92-97, in which Phil’s beloved Marvels are drawn to 
intervene in a conflict in another Galaxy between two alien races, serves as a stand- 
in for Viet Nam itself. This particular allegorization, more than any other in the book, 
indicates the xenophobia of American consciousness as figured through Phil: Viet 
Nam is only representable here as a far-distant conflict between alien races, and the 
Avengers intervene to save the human (American) race, but are not appreciated by 
Americans for risking their lives. Phil Sheldon himself becomes an aging, embit­
tered crank, trying to hold on to the past, and resenting the growing American 
disillusionment with its heroes.
In an attempt to change public opinion about its myths, Sheldon decides that he 
will redeem Spiderman for the public. By now Marvels has reached the 1970s, and a 
growing public bitterness with the ideology offered by the government. Many 
readers of Marvels have taken Phil as the didactic spokesperson for the text as a 
whole. The major problem with agreeing with Phil Sheldon in his critical assessment 
of poor public reception of the heroes is that he is an unusual narrator: he always 
knows less than the reader. What is unconscious to him is conscious to the dedi­
cated Marvel comics fan. Thus when Phil comments that Spiderman should beat up 
Peter Parker for Parker’s slanderous photographs, the reader is afforded a laugh. 
The informed fan of Marvel comics knows they are the same person, and that Phil’s 
crankiness is misguided. When two pages later Phil yells at people on the street, 
“You people! What do you need — the world to actually end?” (#3), the real 
problem is with how Phil continues to see the world. He is angry at people for hating 
the heroes who save them. He wants them to look up to the Marvels. Phil wants the 
innocence which human history will not allow America to preserve. But Spiderman, of 
course, is both at once, both superhero and human, he is the secularized superhero, 
product of a changing world, a symptom of history subjecting humanity to its alienat­
ing necessities, and while Phil cannot see this, the reader can. Phil’s obsession with the 
superheroes, his belief that they will always save humanity, is based in his desperate 
conclusion that their function is to save the innocent. Yet Spiderman fails to do this 
and Gwen Stacy dies, as the reader knows she did in the original comic book in 1973. As 
a result, Phil Sheldon gives up. He abandons his attempt to vindicate or explain the 
heroes. The world turns on, as he puts it: he cannot turn back the clock and recapture 
the way things were (or rather, as he imagined them to once be).
What, then, is the social function of the superhero, according to Marvelsl In 
each book the Marvels seem to serve a double purpose: alternately functioning as 
symbols of American national consciousness and also as figures for the ongoing 
failure of that national self-image in the face of world-historical events. The social 
function of the superhero here is not to save the innocent. Rather the social func­
tion of the superhero is the allegorization of the ongoing, necessary loss of inno­
cence. Marvels moves from a mythic vision of the hero as cultural symbol who 
protects readers from the loss of their ideological innocence, to a refashioning of 
the hero as loss of innocence in favour of the insight of historical consciousness. 
In other words, superheroes are now allegories for the ongoing, unending process 
of reification itself. History is a necessary experience of loss, to be constantly 
renewed. This secularization or reification is a dialectical process. It is the experi­
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ence of loss, the experience of necessity or inevitability, which is also a liberation 
from past forms which have shaped humans. Phil Sheldon has glimmers of this 
dialectical process, of the emancipatory power of history, early in Marvels, but he 
remains finally, curiously, unconscious. In the disjunction between what he would 
like the Marvels to be, and what they are, is the space for a readerly intervention. 
Their social function as Marvels is quite simply to challenge that which humans 
take as given, self-evident, and familiar to consciousness. Throughout the narra­
tive the marvels constantly function to interfere with American national conscious­
ness through the intrusion of that which is larger than consciousness. This mani­
fests itself as the loss of innocence, the American fall from grace in the 1970s when 
Viet Nam forced America to confront its own national failure fully. The marvels must 
remain unconscious to Phil Sheldon. They are that which he is desperately angry to 
account for, explain, understand and redeem, but which remains tantalizingly out of 
reach. As marvels, their function is to not be understood.
The only real solution to Phil Sheldon’s problem is a shift in consciousness 
itself. This shift is not available to Phil but Marvels offers it to the reader: a new way 
of interpreting history, which is just what Marvels does. This requires a new 
perspective on history, which also demands a new kind of perspective on totality. 
More than any other comics writer, Alan Moore imagines the contemporary condi­
tions necessary for envisioning a perspective on totality that has liberating histori­
cal possibilities for the present. In his introduction to Mike Mignola’s collection 
Hellboy: Wake the Devil (1997), Alan Moore illustrates the homology between the 
history of comics as a genre and the history of the human race in the twentieth 
century, and gives a perfect description of the ambivalent condition of 
postmodernity:
The history of comic-book culture, much like the history of any 
culture, is something between a treadmill and a conveyor belt:
[...] [N]owhere do we have the opportunity to say, “We like it 
here. Let’s stop.” History isn’t like that. History is movement, 
and if you’re not riding with it then in all probability you’re be­
neath its wheels.
Lately, however, there seems to be some new scent in the air: a 
sense of new and different possibilities; new ways for us to inter­
act with History. [...]
In this new perspective, there would seem to be new opportuni­
ties for liberating both our culture and ourselves from Time’s 
relentless treadmill. We may not be able to jump off, but we’re no 
longer trapped so thoroughly in our own present moment, with 
the past a dead, unreachable expanse behind us. From our new 
and elevated point of view our History becomes a living land­
scape which our minds are still at liberty to visit, to draw suste­
nance and inspiration from. (Moore, “Introduction,” v)
For Moore, the function of the classic superhero as art form becomes an implicit call 
towards such a postmodern historiographic vision, in which history is no longer a 
relentless treadmill (“an enigmatic flux” to which humanity is subjected, as Lukacs
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puts it [185]), in fact it is no longer a temporal experience at all. History is an 
experience of space, Moore’s “living landscape” which contains potential for new 
historical agency. History becomes present experience, and out of the productive 
combination of past and present an active, emancipatory vision emerges. The past 
must be viewed productively, not as an objective narrative that determines those in 
the present, but as a raw material from which to build a productive human future. 
Moore’s philosophy of history is acted out in Judgment Day (1997).
Judgment Day begins in a manner so trite as to seem banal, apparently asking, 
yet again, the tired questions which derivative superhero comics have asked in the 
wake of Moore and Miller’s work. A superhero is accused of the murder of one of 
his team-members, and the problem is: should he be subjected to a public trial like a 
normal human being? Moore’s lack of interest in the question of “realism” in super­
hero comics emerges in the unusual denouement of the case. Tried by a tribunal of 
superheroes, the accused is acquitted when a strange narrative emerges about a 
magic book, created by Mercury, the mad god of language and laughter. Judgment 
Day is not in fact about the murder trial; it is about this book, which is the book of 
the human race, wherein are writ the stories of all humanity. It is human history as a 
book. When it is passed down to the realm of matter at the dawn of time, this book 
makes its way from hand to hand, possessed by a series of characters who are 
thinly-veiled counterfeits of famous heroes from myth and fiction (King Arthur, 
Tarzan, Solomon Kane, Professor Challenger, Conan). Whoever possesses the book 
has the ability to scratch out the existing story and write a new one, in effect 
rewriting their own future.
This is what happens when a young African-American teen from the ghetto 
named Marcus Langston happens upon the book in 1958. He reads his own story 
and finds that he is foretold to die at 19 robbing a liquor store. Marcus rewrites his 
story: he creates himself as a 1970s superhero. Here, Moore engages in a sublime 
survey of the increasing “realism” that transformed superhero comics in the silver 
age of the 1960s, the bronze age of the 1970s, and finally the dark or baroque age of 
the 1980s. In so doing, Judgment Day situates itself in the Renaissance age of the 
1990s. The actual arrival of the African-American superhero in the 1970s was, of 
course, a movement towards realism in comics that was emancipatory and histori­
cally progressive, an attempt to reflect a changing society, a society which by 
changing was itself attempting to “rewrite” the so-called foretold end for African- 
American lives. Thus that Marcus finds the book in 1958, just as the American Civil 
rights movement was about to explode into action, is no accident. American history 
itself, as it unfurled in the 1960s and 1970s, was just such a re-writing of the book of 
history, an assertion that the visible end for African-Americans needed to be changed 
and rewritten. Marcus does this for himself, but by the mid-1980s Marcus grows 
bored: “He decides to write a nastier, shadowier and more violent world for himself 
... and for everyone else. Our entire reality changed and darkened. Gone was the 
naive wonder of the ‘forties, the exuberance of the ‘fifties and the nobility of the 
‘sixties. Working a dreadful reverse alchemy, Marcus Langston let our world slide 
from a Golden Age to a Silver Age, and finally to a Dark Age. Now, heroes motivated 
only by money or psychopathology stalked a paranoid, apocalyptic landscape of
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post-nuclear mutants and bazooka wielding cyborgs” (#3, n. pag.). In this allegory 
for its own history, Judgment Day surveys the historical effect of reification on the 
superhero form, which culminated, ironically, in the “Watchmen-Dark Knight” ef­
fect: cynical, violent, amoral comics with neither charm, value, nor a sense of their 
own history informing them. This reification is most readily described as a fall from 
grace or loss of innocence, but with ambivalent possibilities within it. In Judgment 
Day, what began as an emancipatory rationalization, a reification of older narrative 
forms in a progressive attempt to create new, more human narratives, resulted in an 
abandonment of history altogether. The result is the postmodern condition, an 
apocalyptic cinemascape of post-human mutants and cyborgs. Yet it began as a 
progressive action: the creation of a more human world where an urban black youth 
was not pre-destined to die robbing a liquor store.
Thus for Moore, this fall from grace is not to be lamented nostalgically but 
employed productively, for the new perspective on history it makes possible. Judg­
ment Day is a narrative not of disaster but of apocalyptic revelation and insight: 
here, it is insight about comic books themselves and their perspective on history. 
Like comic books themselves, human history is not a determined narrative, but a 
dialectical narrative, like the book of life which can always be rewritten. How, then, 
does Moore imagine comics can give readers the perspective on history that allows 
them to escape the vision of history as a treadmill (a mechanical determinist narra­
tive) and see history instead as a totality, as a “living landscape which our minds 
are still at liberty to visit” (Moore, “Introduction,” v)? The answer is found not at 
the level of content, but at the level of form. This is appropriate to the philosophical 
concerns of this essay, since, as Lukacs argues, history is always the achieved 
forms taken by human activity (185-86). If humanity is the content, history is the 
form, and the dialectical intervention posits an attempted identity between the two. 
While Moore is the most prolific of contemporary comics writers, I want to focus 
upon the example of Moore’s work which could be understood to be retro-pastiche 
in its most derogatory sense, Supreme (1996-2000), in order to unearth Moore’s 
theory of history as embodied in superhero comics.
Supreme began as a rationalized copy of Superman, refigured as violent and 
inhuman. Moore took over the writing and revised the revision, transforming Su­
preme into a charming piece of escapism, reminiscent of an idealized Golden Age 
superhero. Yet Supreme is a contemporary hero with a Golden Age history, and this 
latter element manifests itself in the book through the mimicking of historical comic 
book styles and forms by Moore and artist Rick Veitch. When these retro-narra- 
tives are contrasted with Moore’s contemporary Supreme narrative and its style of 
illustration, a stylistic dissonance is created. Initially, the contemporary illustration 
style is simply the overwrought, cold, technical veneer of most contemporary su­
perhero illustration, dominated by an inhuman, pneumatic, generic, anatomical ren­
dering of figures in hard lines and angles, bulging with grotesquely overdeveloped 
muscles, combined with technical, impersonal computer-coloring that blends with 
and shades the images. It is, in my opinion, superhero illustration at its absolute 
worst, affording nothing resembling enjoyment. This contemporary style is con­
stantly interrupted by Rick Veitch’s accomplished illustrations of a variety of older
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styles: EC Horror comics of the 1950s, DC comics heroes of the ‘40s, ‘50s, ‘60s and 
‘70s, Jack Kirby’s Marvel work from the 1960s, and even a parody of a famous Mad 
magazine superhero parody by Harvey Kurtzman and Wally Wood 
(“Supremelvin!!!”). Veitch’s illustration style is warm, open and welcoming, filled 
with humour and caricature, while Bill Wray’s coloring is deliberately flat, four- 
colour work, sharply separated and muted in tones, representing a simple, unam­
biguous two-dimensionality. Todd Klein’s lettering is similarly nostalgic in its evo­
cation of past forms. Yet the effect of Supreme as a whole is that these incompatible 
styles, the old and the new, are forced to cohabit uncomfortably. There is an effect 
that needs to be described here, of an unhappy contradiction created for the reader 
in the dissonance between styles. If any single style may be understood to embody 
an ideology of form and thus function as an ideologeme, then I suggest that the 
content of the form of Veitch’s nostalgic images evokes the traditional, ideological 
social function of the superhero, as collective symptom of innocent, closed con­
sciousness, the all-too recognizably human superhero. Meanwhile the contempo­
rary style evokes the reified, rationalized, “realistic” hero, which is itself no less 
ideological: the superhero as fascist, as remorseless, amoral vigilante, as essen­
tially inhuman. As storyteller, however, Moore does not ask or allow the reader to 
choose between them. Instead, the effect of Supreme is to effectively force the 
reader to inhabit the contradiction between styles as an untenable reading posi­
tion. It is, in other words, a generic discontinuity at the level of form which locates 
the reader in productive incoherence. Supreme presents both pleasure and discom­
fort, familiarity and alienation, and Supreme asks the reader not to choose between 
the two, but to instead find the productive pleasure to be found in alienation itself, 
as an ongoing process. I am suggesting here that Moore’s work on Supreme is in 
fact the performance of the superhero comic as deliberate failure, but that Supreme 
turns the alienation between styles into the joy of aesthetic experience itself. This 
is a utopian glimpse of history in the contradiction of discontinuity, as that which 
emerges in the failure of the ideology of form.
Finally, the critic is left with the superhero today fulfilling an ambivalent, Janus­
faced function, and the artist who reveals the two faces of the superhero most 
clearly is Warren Ellis. Today, the superhero is fully emancipated from its function 
as crime-fighter. In fact, practically the only place one can still see superheroes 
fulfilling this role is in motion pictures. This is an exaggeration meant to emphasize 
that comic books have largely abandoned this ideological function in their con­
tents. In Planetary, drawn by John Cassaday, Ellis offers the function of the super­
hero as the maintenance of a sense of totality, but of totality as a strangeness for 
the human mind. The heroes of Planetary, while they have recognizably superhu­
man abilities, are not superheroes in any traditional sense. They do not “fight 
crime.” Instead they are “archaeologists of the impossible,” as the cover of the first 
issue announces. “We gather information on the hidden wonders of the world. 
Mystery archaeologists. There’s a hundred years of fantastic events that Planetary 
intends to excavate. We’re mapping the secret history of the twentieth century” 
(Planetary: All Over the World and Other Stories, “Preview Story” n. pag.) This 
function, exemplified by the heroes in the Planetary organization, is juxtaposed with
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the villains of the narrative, a barely-disguised rendition of The Fantastic Four 
transformed into Cold War American military despots who serve the opposite func­
tion to Planetary. The function of these “Four Voyagers” is to suppress and control 
the strange, to capture and use the strange for their owns ends. It is only by 
recognizing that the Four Voyagers are Ellis’s vision of the effect of the Cold War on 
human history that the reader can grasp the political importance of the heroes of 
Planetary as a commentary on the social function of the superhero today.
In Planetary, strangeness erupts in the world due to the creation of a computer 
in 1945 by a group of globe-trotting adventurers whom Ellis bases on Doc Savage 
and his associates. The computer is a machine, “a theoretical snowflake” that 
actually creates other universes as theoretical models for solving the problem of 
history itself (Planetary: All Over the World #1, n. pag.). The team of adventurers 
create the machine despite the risks it poses, risks based on the possibility that “the 
solved equation could rewrite the entire planet’s reality, making its mathematical 
answer an objective truth.” The machine’s interpretation of reality might become 
reality. The computer is created anyway because “It could furnish us with a solved 
equation that constituted the perfect plan to end the war as soon as possible, with 
a minimum death, creating the best possible world society as a result.” As in The 
Dark Knight Returns, the problem of history in the form of World War II, its trau­
matic contradiction and the attempt to resolve it, is the driving force of the narra­
tive. However, the result of the machine is a multiplicity of universes, with a “reality 
bleed” between them: superhumans from a reality next door realize their universe is 
just a theoretical equation to be tested and rubbed out in the search for the perfect 
world, and they try to destroy Doc Brass’s reality. Henceforth, every issue of 
Planetary sees its representatives investigating a strange locale and incident which 
seems to be the result of this theoretical snowflake, and in large part all that Plan­
etary do is gather information on the strange, such as an Island near Japan full of 
dead creatures resembling Godzilla and his ilk (Planetary: All Over the World #2). 
The monsters are there to “remind us of our greatness and horror,” a Mishima-like 
fanatic explains, and certainly this seems to be the point of the story: the final image 
of issue two is of a winged monster flying overhead, followed by the look of pure 
joy this brings to the faces of the Planetary heroes.
Thus the function of Planetary is not so much to police the bleed between 
universes from which the strange erupts, as to bear witness to it and celebrate it. 
But at the same time, this simple activity of “archaeology” is portrayed as saving 
the world. The constant refrain of Planetary is that the “world” is strange, and that 
it should be kept that way. The only real conflict in the book arises from superhe­
roes. It eventually emerges that the villainous “Four Voyagers” are themselves 
products of exposure to the theoretical snowflake in space during the race to reach 
the moon before the U.S.S.R. (Planetary: All Over the World #6), and that these 
now superpowered Cold Warriors have since 1961 harvested and sequestered the 
strange phenomena that have erupted out of the bleed between universes. Plan­
etary member Elijah Snow confronts one of the Four Voyagers: “I only know the 
barest part of what you do. I know that you’ve done more than your share of 
making the world mediocre. The things we’ve seen here alone: if I understand them
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right, then they alone could save millions of lives a year” (#6). The Four Voyagers, 
created by the theoretical snowflake of the multiverse, are the secret history that 
Planetary seeks to unearth and bring to light. The Four Voyagers, a thinly-veiled 
version of Marvel’s Fantastic Four, serve as a commentary by Ellis on the tradi­
tional, ideological function of the superhero. The Four Voyagers are cold-war his­
tory as it actually happened: history as the repression of possibility. What has been 
disavowed by cold war history is still present, as the disavowed itself, as the 
strange history Planetary seek to bring to light. The Four Voyagers have quite 
literally impoverished the world through their deeds, deeds which were precisely to 
make superheroes functional. In issue number ten, this ideological and literal 
functionalizing of the superhero is rendered with brutal clarity. Planetary learn that 
the Four Voyagers have for decades been tracking down and neutralizing powerful 
figures for the sole purpose of furthering military intelligence. The three figures 
who are cut down by the Four Voyagers are an alien infant wrapped in a red cape 
(Superman), an enlightened amazonian ambassador from a hidden all-female civili­
zation (Wonder Woman), and an alien with a lantern-shaped piece of technology in 
his chest (Green Lantern). All three are destroyed by the Four Voyagers so that their 
technology can be sold to military interests, in other words, so that they can be 
rendered functional. What Ellis suggests here is that the silver-age superheroes of the 
Cold War, fighting crime and communists, destroyed the essential strangeness and 
wonder of Golden Age heroes. This revisionism is creatively false, suggesting that the 
functionalizing of the superhero happened after 1961, when in fact the Golden Age 
heroes served ideological ends as well (although we might keep in mind here Frank 
Miller’s insight that Superman was originally an antiestablishment, people’s hero, 
serving as a progressive wish-fulfillment rather than as a tool of the status quo).
Planetary arrive as heroes whose function is to retroactively de-functionalize 
superheroes, free them from the burden of mythic, ideological weight and restore to 
them a potential that in fact was not necessarily ever fully realized before: their role 
as wonders and as strange. They will change history by unearthing its strange­
ness, and this will serve the human race. Planetary then, articulates most clearly 
the concern of the revisionist comics considered here: superheroes are a liability 
when they are functionaries, bound to the yoke of social utility. The cold war in 
particular is responsible for the reduction of the superhero to the role of function­
ary, as exemplified in Marvel comics of the 1960s, where the heroes were cold 
warriors constantly combating the red menace. Stan Lee and Jack Kirby’s Fantastic 
Four in particular are representative of this functionalizing: in the original comic 
they gain their powers through exposure to cosmic rays while trying to beat the 
U.S.S.R. into space (Lee and Kirby, Fantastic Four# 1) and go on to fight a series of 
communist villains from behind the Iron Curtain, such as the Red Ghost and his 
army of super-apes (#13). Ellis’s refiguring of them as the villainous “Four Voyagers” 
is merely a description of how the Fan tastic Four were an ideologically impoverished 
betrayal of the potentials implicit in the superhero form. Planetary demonstrates that 
the only option then available is to render heroes functionless, bereft of use, which is 
merely to restore to them their true functions, which is to be strange and wondrous. In 
this way they will serve humanity without usurping humanity’s place.
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This defunctionalizing is a planetary concern. The image of the entire planet is 
frequent here, in fact incorporated into the title logo of the book, and the figure of 
“the world” is employed often, as in fact it is in essentially all the comics considered 
so far. The planet is an image of totality, but of totality refigured here not as an 
absolute, or a totalitarian horizon of closure. Totality is presented in its essence as 
multiplicity, as the multiverse (one universe for every atom of the planet) which is 
the possibility and presence of the strange that breaks humans from the ideologi­
cal, liberates humanity, for example, from the mythic thinking of cold war politics 
that has impoverished reality. “Planetary consciousness,” as Alan Moore calls it in 
his introduction to the first Planetary collection, is the outside of ideological con­
sciousness. It is not a position of total coherence but a position of totality that is 
only present as incoherent strangeness for the mind. Ellis thus demonstrates the 
contemporary function of the superhero to be to emancipate the superhero from 
functionality. Yet the Janus-face of this contemporary function of the superhero 
emerges when one grasps that for Ellis these seemingly opposed functions, of 
those who suppress the wonderful and those whocelebrate the strange, are in fact 
an identity. This identity emerges in the story called “Terra Occulta.” This story 
presents an alternate reality in which the role of the Four Voyagers is played by the 
Planetary heroes themselves. Here, it is Planetary who have harvested superheroes 
and functionalized them: the world has been revolutionized by a great technological 
leap, which is the result of reverse-engineering alien technology and performing au­
topsies on superhumans in order to create genetic plug-ins for humans. The three 
figures who should have become Superman, Batman and Wonder Woman track down 
the masterminds of Planetary and kill them, effectively taking back their world.
It is a peculiar narrative, in which characters portrayed as unequivocally heroic 
by Ellis in some worlds become, for no apparent reason, the very thing they are 
fighting against in another. Thus there are no more “villains” here, just superheroes 
in conflict with each other. The inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that superhe­
roes are both the problem and the solution for humanity. They are as unavoidable 
as they are untenable. Ellis performs the same gesture in “Ruling the World,” in which 
the Planetary heroes observe another of Ellis’s creations, the heroes known as The 
Authority, coming in conflict with villains from an alternate reality. These villains are 
simply monstrous versions of The Authority themselves, and Planetary conclude that 
it demonstrates what the Authority could become: monstrous creatures bent on ruling 
the world. Planetary can resist this by, as always, keeping the world strange.
Thus the ideological and the strange or historical are not opposites but two 
sides of a coin, or two separate moments in a single narrative process or substance. 
Ellis’s The Authority is a book dominated by the ambiguous role of the superhero 
today, creating interpretive confusion and incoherence for readers due to attempts 
to read the book literally. It serves, perhaps, as the final word on superheroes. Ellis 
created the title as a spin-off from a more conventional superhero book. In The 
Authority, in contrast, the heroes begin by explicitly rejecting their traditional roles 
as crime-fighters, realizing that this is merely an ideological social function that 
maintains the status quo. It does not save, change or improve the world in any way, 
and saving and changing the world becomes their mandate. The Authority is yet
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another narrative that seems to ask, what would superheroes do if they were real? 
Read literally, the book answers that they would make themselves authorities an­
swering to no one, policing the earth, and changing it for what they conceive to be 
the better. They would do the human race’s thinking for it. With issue #13, when 
Mark Millar took over the writing of The Authority, this is unquestionably what the 
book became: comically violent, sex- and drug-filled stories about “realistic” super­
heroes who answer to no authority but themselves, who travel the Earth unseating 
oppressive regimes and interfering in human affairs. They are irresponsible social 
engineers who slaughter cold war Marvel superheroes by the dozens. Yet I think 
Mark Millar fundamentally misinterpreted The Authority because he read it literally. 
Consider though that the three villains that Warren Ellis’s Authority fight over 
twelve issues are plainly escapist: an absurd Fu Manchu-like terrorist from a hidden 
island who simply enjoys terrorizing humanity and has no discernible political 
agenda, an alien fascist from an alternate Earth who wants to use the human race as 
a breeding ground with which to repopulate his species, and finally God, in the form 
of a giant pyramid, who returns to Earth after a long absence and finds it overrun 
with “insects” to be exterminated. If the reader considers the lack of realism in this 
supposedly “realistic” superhero narrative a clearer understanding of the allegory 
of The Authority emerges.
The “villains” they fight are not “realistic,” and thus the reader must wonder 
what exactly the Authority do to really change or save the world, as they repeatedly 
insist they want to do. The culmination of Ellis’s narrative transforms The Authority 
into an allegory. They kill God, the ultimate villain and enemy of the human race, the 
metaphysical itself. This story arc, entitled “Outer Dark,” begins with an image of 
the Earth and the words “We are not free” (The Authority: Under New Manage­
ment #9). These words must be interpreted: humans are not free as long as they are 
not the full owners of the Earth. Thus The Authority is an exploration of the problem 
of reification, secularization, and finally humanization of the world itself. In The 
Authority, saving the world and changing the world “for the better” as it is generi- 
cally described are essentially collapsed or conflated into the same activity. Saving 
the world and changing the world leads to the necessity of unseating and killing 
God, moreover of reclaiming the world from God. The problem of the “realistic” 
superhero comic is really the problem of the more “realistic” world, the more human 
world, the reified, modern world where all metaphysical alibis, all traditional think­
ing and all maintenance of the status quo, are gradually dissolved, broken up, and 
bereft of authority. The only remaining authority is the authority of the human 
itself. The Authority represent this secularized authority, humanity answerable 
only to itself, and the narrative raises the question: where does reification end? The 
answer: with the death of god.
Yet this solution is not presented as a solution, at least in Ellis’s conclusion. The 
death of god is also, significantly, the death of the Authority’s leader, Jenny Sparks, 
mutually exclusive positions at once, the position of the human and the position of 
god. This task is impossible for the mind because the mind does not yet have 
categories of consciousness outside of the logical opposition of the metaphysical 
and the material. Yet the process of thought can conceive of such an impossible
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position, if only as an impossible position, and this itself is a kind of utopian 
promise. The function of the superhero, then, at its very best, is to simply occupy 
the position of a problem for the mind, a troubling, unanswerable question found in 
a figure which vacillates uncertainly between human and inhuman, between human 
and metahuman, which claims to serve humanity while dehumanizing humanity 
through that service. The function of the superhero today can only finally be to 
embody impossibility, and thus to give readers a fractional glimpse of the promise 
of humanity as its own History.
Notes
1 See my essay, “The Tides of History: Alan Moore’s Historiographic Vision,” 
forthcoming in the on-line journal ImageTexT: Interdisciplinary Comics Studies, 
for a discussion of Moore and Gibbons’ Watchmen.
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